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1.0.   Introduction 
 
I am delighted to be part of this inaugural lecture of the World Press Freedom Day 
Public Lecture Series under the auspices of the SABMiller Chair of Media and 
Democracy. The title of my lecture is ‘media in the service of citizens’. I believe that 
this title resonates with the many discussions being carried on around the world 
about the global theme for this year’s World Press Freedom Day, namely ‘media, 
development and poverty eradication’.  
 
I am humbled to realise that I am, in fact, joining a great multitude of people around 
the world celebrating the World Press Freedom Day. Although this is a moment of 
celebration for some, it is also a moment of lamentation for others. For example, our 
colleagues in Zimbabwe, under siege from a recalcitrant state, are celebrating the 
World Press Freedom Day in lamentation. On this very day, they are engaged in a 
public campaign to call for the self-regulation of the media, as opposed to state-
imposed statutory regulation.1 Here in South Africa, the National Editors’ Forum 
(SANEF) is involved in a campaign to locate media freedom as your freedom.  
 
I am delighted to be part of these celebrations for another, more Afro-centric reason, 
namely that the institution of the World Press Freedom Day was influenced by the 
1991 Windhoek Declaration on Promoting an Independent and Pluralistic African 
Press. It underscores a significant African contribution to global media freedom.   
 
The global theme reflects UNESCO’s strategy to correlate media freedom with the 
eradication of poverty.2 In turn, the theme ties up with the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) agreed to by 189 countries following their signing of the UN 
1 Nyakunu, N. Research and Information Officer, MISA-Zimbabwe. 2006. Invitation to World 
Press Freedom Day Celebrations. Personal correspondence. 26 April. Harare.  
2 UNESCO. 2006. World Press Freedom Day 2006 – 3 May: Media, Development and Poverty 
Eradication. [0]. Available. http://www.portal.unesco.org. Accessed on 26/04/2006. 
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Millennium Declaration in September 2000. Although this lecture is not about the 
MDGs, let me, as a point of information, indicate that the 8 MDGs relate to the 
following: 
 
1. Eradicating extreme poverty and hunger; 
2. Achieving universal primary education; 
3. Promoting gender equality and empowering women; 
4. Reducing child mortality; 
5. Improving maternal health; 
6. Combating HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; 
7. Ensuring environmental sustainability; and  
8. Developing a global partnership for development.3  
 
There is a shift in development thinking which links the attainment of such goals to 
more than just technical-economic solutions. For example, Nobel Prize-winning 
economist Amatya Sen sees the expansion of freedom both as the primary end and 
primary means of development. He calls for ‘social development’ -- enhanced 
literacy, accessible and affordable health care, the empowerment of women, and the 
free flow of information (my emphasis) -- as necessary precursors of the kind of 
development most economists are concerned about, namely: increase in gross 
national product, rise in personal incomes, industrialisation, and technological 
advance.4 Development activism is increasingly asserting the idea that meeting the 
MDGs will require people to have a much stronger sense of ownership of the 
development strategies designed to benefit them. The success of any such strategies 
will therefore depend upon citizens, particularly those living in poverty, being able to 
hold their governments to account and to engage actively as informed citizens.5  
 
It is this perspective – the correlation between development and freedom – which I 
wish to pursue in my lecture today. It seems reasonable, therefore, to structure my 
lecture around three main sub-topics: (i) citizenship conceived as freedom; (ii) media 
3 World Bank. 2006. Overview: understanding poverty. [0]. Available: 
http://web.worldbank.org. Accessed on 26/04/2006. 
4 Quoted in Human Rights Watch. 2006. Book reviews: Development as freedom, by Amatya 
Sen, New York, Anchor Books, 1999. Reviewed by Rona Peligal, Director of Foundation 
Relations, Human Rights Watch. [0]. Available: 
http://www.hrw.org/community/bookreviews/sen.htm. Accessed on 26/04/2006. 
5 Deane, J. (FORTHCOMING). Communication for empowerment: developing media strategies 
in support of vulnerable groups. [SI]: United Nations Development Programme – Bureau for 
Development Policy. 
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conceived as citizenship enhancers; and (iii) the challenges that pose threats to what 
I am characterising as the ‘media-citizens compact’. Let me proceed, then, to deal 
with each one of these points. 
 
2.0. Citizenship as freedom 
 
The concept of ‘citizenship’ provides a useful frame for analysing the interface 
between the public and the media. Citizenship has never been a fixed state; it is 
constantly in a state of flux. This quality makes it attractive for analysing how it is 
constantly being constructed, deconstructed and reconstructed, as Kivikuru 
observes.6 The concept has generally come to be associated with liberal-democracy. 
From the ancient Greek city-states onwards, the general conception of citizenship 
has been based on at least four assumptions, namely that: 
 
1. Citizens must be well-informed; 
2. Citizens are interested in politics; 
3. Citizens have equal rights to speak and participate in decision-making; and 
4. All decisions are submitted to public discussion.7 
 
In turn, this construction of citizenship is informed by the concept of the public 
sphere. Proposed by German social theorist Jürgen Habermas, this analytical 
framework conceptualises an open space or terrain in which citizens can have free 
and rational debate about public issues. This is not the place to do justice to this 
theory. As an explanatory device, it has problems of its own. Who defines rational 
debate? Aren’t emotions a part of human reasoning? What is the legitimate scale of 
participation in the public sphere? Is there a singular public sphere? What are the 
gender relations in this space? Suffice to point out that the Habermasian public 
sphere has helped to construct citizenship more in terms of an active human being 
endowed with freedoms and rights to participate in political deliberation than as a 
subject of the formalistic trappings of electoral-liberal democracy.8  
 
6 Kivikuru, U. 2006. Top-down or bottom-up? Radio in the service of democracy: experiences 
from South Africa and Namibia. The International Communication Gazette 68(1): 5-31. 
7 Ibid: 5-6. 
8 Scammel, M & Semetko, H. 2000. The media and democracy, in The media, journalism and 
democracy edited by M. Scammel & H. Semetko. Aldershot, Burlington USA, Singapore and 
Sydney: Ashgate & Dartmouth. 
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There are alternative approaches to conceptualising citizenship. As suggested 
already, the liberal-democratic view of citizenship claims that all human beings have 
rights by virtue of their humanity and that such rights are universal. In other words, 
liberal theory treats the individual as existing prior to society and hence as the 
ultimate bearer of these rights, regardless of their status in society. On the other 
hand, ‘African particularists’ challenge this liberal claim to universalism. They 
emphasise the particularity or cultural relativism of rights. The rights of groups take 
priority over the rights of individuals.9 African exceptionalism is itself critiqued on the 
basis that it is a political strategy used by the African ruling elites to exclude the 
majority of their populations from enjoying the rights naturally due to them.  
 
Mahmood Mamdani takes up this point and refers to the duality between ‘citizens’ 
and ‘subjects’ to portray the state-society relations in post-colonial Africa. He argues 
that the urban-based ruling elites enjoy more citizenship rights than the rural poor. 
The rural poor live as ‘subjects’ -- a legacy of colonialism. The only right they can 
exercise is the right to vote for their representatives.10 No wonder the late Nigerian 
scholar Claude Ake could find no solace in the liberal trappings of the African post-
colonial state and lamented: ‘Instead of being a public force, the state in post-colonial 
Africa tends to be privatized by the ruling elite’.11  
 
It would seem to me that a viable conceptualisation of citizenship would have to treat 
it as that dynamic complex whole which embraces the juridical, political, economic 
and cultural entitlements available to individuals or collectivities in a given territory by 
which they can actively participate in the public affairs of that territory. This definition 
provides for an active citizenship. This definition recognises the legality of citizenship, 
as bestowed by the state through a system of laws and procedures. It also 
acknowledges the civil and political as well as the socio-economic rights that must 
accrue to citizens. Finally, it acknowledges state agency in facilitating the enjoyment 
of these rights.  
 
9 Kabeer, N (ed). 2005. Inclusive citizenship: meanings and expressions. London & New York: 
Zed Books: 1-2. 
10 Cited in, Moyo, D. 2006. Broadcasting policy reform and democratisation in Zambia and 
Zimbabwe, 1990-2005: Global pressures, national responses. PhD thesis, University of Oslo, 
Oslo.  
11 Ake, Claude. 2000. The feasibility of democracy in Africa. Wiltshire: Council for the 
Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA). 
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This perspective of citizenship enables us to interrogate the different ways in which 
people participate in or are excluded from processes of development.12 To deepen 
our understanding of the concept of citizenship, some scholars suggest a research 
agenda that specifies the interplay among the following research themes: (i) 
citizenship; (ii) socio-economic rights; (iii) civil and political rights; and (iv) public 
discourse.13 
              
Clearly, then, citizenship analysis powerfully invokes the notions of ‘freedoms’ and 
‘rights’ accruing to people in a given geo-political territory. The Afrobarometer 
surveys, conducted in twelve African countries, including Botswana, Ghana, Lesotho, 
Malawi, Mali, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe, seem to support this hypothesis. When asked, ‘what, if anything, does 
democracy mean to you?’, 40 percent of the respondents in these countries referred 
to civil liberties, especially freedom of expression. Afrobarometer studies thus 
concluded that Africans regarded democracy mainly in terms of freedom, which is a 
liberal conception. They also valued opportunities for ordinary people to participate in 
politics.14 Since all theorising on democracy embraces ‘freedom’ as a central 
principle, whether that freedom is individualised or collectivised, I must conclude that 
citizenship is indeed ‘freedom’.  
 
Within the context of Africa, this renewed interest in citizenship rights and freedoms 
is clearly traceable to the 1990s. This is largely because of the collapse of post-
colonial one-party states in what was referred to as the ‘second liberation.’ The term 
‘second liberation’ is used by scholars to underscore the betrayed hopes surrounding 
the liberation from colonial rule in the 1960s.15 In South Africa, the end of the 
apartheid regime became a rallying point for vigorous debates about a renewal of 
citizenship in the aftermath of the democratic elections of April 1994. With the 
‘liberalisation’ of many political systems across the African continent, there was an 
adoption of a liberal political culture, with emphasis on the more formalistic aspects of 
democracy (such as periodic elections, the separation of powers, media freedom, the 
rule of law, etc.).    
 
12 Cited in, ibid.: 9. 
13 Cited in, ibid.: 9-10. 
14 Afrobarometer. 2002. Afrobarometer briefing paper no.1 April 2002. Key findings about 
public opinion in Africa. [0]. Available: http://www.afrobarometer.org. 
15 Diamond, L. & Plattner, MF (eds). 1999. Democratisation in Africa. Baltimore and London: 
Johns Hopkins University Press.  
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The 1990s indeed marked a distinct era characterised by hope for the emancipation 
of the African continent from despotism, paternalism, patriarchalism, 
unconstitutionalism, racism, presidentialism, etc. In fact, as late as 1999, liberal 
optimists like E. Gyimah-Boadi were able to celebrate ‘the rebirth of African 
liberalism’, citing ‘the rise of constitutionalism’, ‘the flourishing of civil society’, the 
comeback of parliaments, and ‘the trend toward liberalization’, as examples of the 
institutionalisation of democracy on the continent.16  
 
However, the decade of celebration was soon to give way to pessimism. For some, 
this is an indictment of the formalism of liberal democratic politics. Claude Ake, in his 
book The feasibility of democracy in Africa offers a passionate critique of ‘liberal 
democracy’, citing the following: 
 
Instead of the collectivity, liberal democracy focuses on the individual whose 
claims are ultimately placed above those of the collectivity. It replaces 
government by the people with government by the consent of the people. 
Instead of the sovereignty of the people it offers the sovereignty of law… 
 
In the final analysis, liberal democracy repudiates popular power. It is not really 
a political morality in the sense that classical democracy was to the Athenians 
but a political convenience, the political correlate of the market…17 
 
This disenchantment with liberal democracy is evident in empirical research. For 
instance, the Afrobarometer studies demonstrate that while 69 percent of Africans 
interviewed say that democracy is ‘always preferable’, only 58 percent say that they 
are satisfied with democracy’s performance. An interesting finding for Africa is that 
about 89 percent of the people interviewed isolate ‘improvements in the 
socioeconomic sphere’ as the most important feature of a democratic society, 
underscoring the importance of the socioeconomic base of citizenship.18  
 
The Afrobarometer study singled out ‘low political participation in between elections’ 
as a challenge in African liberal democracies. For instance, 47 percent of the 
16 Gyimah-Boadi, E. 1999. The rebirth of African liberalism, in Democratisation in Africa edited 
by L. Diamond & MF. Plattner. Baltimore & London: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
17 Ake, Claude. 2000. The feasibility of democracy in Africa. Wiltshire: Council for the 
Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA). 
18 Afrobarometer. 2002. Afrobarometer briefing paper no.1 April 2002. Key findings about 
public opinion in Africa. [0]. Available: http://www.afrobarometer.org. 
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respondents reported attending a community meeting; 43 percent reported joining 
with others to raise an issue; and 11 percent reported joining a protest. Notably, only 
14 percent of the respondents had contacted a government or political party official 
during the previous year. Indeed, respondents in Africa’s new democracies complain 
of a wide gap between citizens and their political representatives.19 
 
Whether there is a rebirth of African liberalism or not, it is clear that people cherish a 
citizenship that is grounded in freedom. It is also clear that liberal democratic politics 
requires much more than just its formal legal systems and procedures in order to 
guarantee active participation by the public. There is empirical research, such as I 
have quoted, to justify the value Africans attach to freedom of expression which can 
enable them to actively engage in public deliberation and influence public policy. I 
believe that the media can enhance this freedom. I turn now to consider the ‘media-
citizens compact’. 
 
3.0. The media-citizens compact: media as citizenship enhancers 
 
The question of whether the media and citizens can form a ‘compact’ in defence of 
democracy assumes that media institutions are staffed by citizens who are 
themselves interested in enjoying their citizenship to the full. It can be legitimately 
argued that deepened citizenship freedom can deepen media freedom, and vice 
versa.  
 
There is a justification for the argument I am making. Let me foreground it with two 
perspectives on the nature of media institutions. Gwen Ansell and Ahmed Veriava, in 
their book Human rights handbook for Southern African communicators, attempt to 
uncover the ‘human rights’ basis of media reporting. They do this, firstly, by 
highlighting the ‘fourth estate’ conceptualisation of the media. This view, they 
contend, suggests that the media stand apart from the rest of society, with sharply 
defined interests of their own – and an entitlement to a special set of rights. The 
media are thus seen as wholly ‘objective’: simply gathering and relaying facts.20  
 
Secondly, Answell and Veriava remind us that the media are now increasingly seen 
as ‘simply another part of civil society’. In other words, the media are within society 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ansell, G & Veriava, A. 2000. Human rights handbook for Southern African communicators. 
Johannesburg: Institute for the Advancement of Journalism. 
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and not outside it. They have no special rights, separate from the rights they ought to 
have as citizens of a democracy.21  
 
The term ‘civil society’ is not unproblematic. It has its origins in European 
philosophical thought -- from John Locke’s ‘property and liberty’; Adam Ferguson’s 
‘rude nations’ and the need to protect civil liberties; Adam Smith’s ‘economic man’ 
actively pursuing ‘the necessaries, conveniences, and amusements of human life; 
Emmanuel Kant’s ‘categorical imperative’ as an alternative to pure self-interest; 
Georg Friedrich Hegel’s  ‘human needs’ as the basis of political organisation; Alexis 
de Tocqueville’s ‘civic competence’; to Karl Marx’s and Antonio Gramsci’s egalitarian 
civil society as the basis of citizenship.22  
 
The more modern conception of ‘civil society’ approximates what John Keane defines 
as “a complex and dynamic ensemble of legally protected non-governmental 
institutions that tend to be non-violent, self-organizing…and permanently in tension 
with each other and with the state institutions that ‘frame’, construct and enable their 
activities.”23 However, as Francis Nyamnjoh aptly observes, this definition limits civil 
society to more liberal formalistic or legalistic civic associations, and ignores the 
unorganised civil society or networks of people that might spring into life in order to 
empower themselves en masse against any perceived dangers -- from the state, the 
corporate sector, the media, to NGOs.24 This resembles Kelly’s ‘pluralist 
citizenship’.25  
 
It seems to me that the media are much more than just John Keane’s ‘complex and 
dynamic ensemble’. Nor are they reducible to the unorganised notion of civil society 
referred to by Nyamnjoh. An irrefutable point, however, is that the media do stem 
from civil society as an aggregate of individuals or collectivities. I thus see the media 
as ‘extra-civil-society’ institutions that can be available to reflect the ‘tension’ within 
civil society and the ‘tension’ between civil society and other actors, including the 
state. The media are sufficiently socially embedded to be part of civil society; they 
21 Ibid.: 166. 
22 Media and citizenship. 2006. [0]. Available: 
http://wwwspot.colorado.edu/~calabres/Media%20citizenship.htm. 
23 In Ibid.: 3. 
24 Nyamnjoh, F. 2005. Africa’s media: democracy & the politics of belonging. London, New 
York & Pretoria: Zed Books & UNISA Press. 
25 This might tie up with what Kelly calls ‘pluralist citizenship’ – involvement in many networks 
or associations. Kelly, GA. 1995. Who needs a theory of citizenship?, in Theorising citizenship 
edited by R. Beiner. New York: State University of New York Press. 
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are also sufficiently professionalised to be independent from civil society. This view 
allows us to say: (i) that the media can be distinct professional organisations, 
answering to their codes of conduct; and (ii) that the media must be responsive to the 
‘public interest’. 
 
It is in the idea of ‘the public interest’ that we can also locate the ‘media-citizens 
compact’. This is largely because the profession of journalism justifies its relevance 
in terms of the extent to which it serves the public interest. Journalism codes of 
conduct, internationally and domestically, use the ‘public interest’ as a central 
yardstick of their connectedness with the public.  For me, the concept of ‘public 
interest’ or ‘public service’ (however defined) cuts across the legislated divisions of 
media institutions into public, commercial and community media, as the case might 
be. Experience has taught us that such divisions are not discrete -- ‘public’ media are 
‘commercialising’; ‘community’ media are entertainment-based; and commercial 
media do carry ‘quality’ content. For this reason, it is tempting to treat ‘public interest’ 
or ‘public service’ more as a genre than as an institution, in order to make it 
applicable to all types of media. The difference must lie in the degree to which one 
media type can practise ‘public interest’ or ‘public service’ journalism. Writing 
specifically about ‘public service broadcasting’, Pieter Fourie laments the influence of 
the capitalist market on the practice of public service broadcasting, not least the 
inducement to compete with commercial operators. He invites us to consider treating 
the notion of ‘public service broadcasting’ as a genre so that even commercial and 
community broadcasters can incorporate aspects of the genre.26 That way, public 
service broadcasting ceases to be the preserve of state-funded media systems. 
 
But the ‘media-citizens compact’ is not without challenges. Let me now consider this 
sub-topic. 
 
4.0. The challenges of the media-citizens compact 
 
The ideal of the media-citizens compact faces threats from three major sources: the 
media, the state and the citizens themselves. Let me briefly deal with each one in 
turn.  
 
26 Fourie, PJ. [Sa]. Leapfrogging into the market approach: the loss of public service 
broadcasting for development and nation building. [0]. Available: 
http://www.pucrs.br/famecos/iamcr/textos/fourie.pdf. Accessed on 20/03/2006. 
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1. Media-centric threats 
 
The media, as an institution, presents a number of problems which people use to 
justify their distrust of it. To the extent that these can sever the much-needed trust 
between media and citizens, they are presented here as ‘threats’.  
 
Media commercialisation 
 
Following the liberalisation of the media landscape across Africa in the 1990s, the 
commercial imperative dominated most media-institutional survival strategies, 
particularly of the state broadcasting systems. It was not surprising that, given the fall 
of the apartheid regime and the consequent liberalisation of the media landscape in 
South Africa, the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) embarked upon a 
‘corporatisation’ strategy whereupon it privatised some public radio stations and 
restructured itself into a ‘public service broadcaster’ and a ‘commercial public service 
broadcaster’. The latter would, so the reasoning went, generate revenue to finance 
the public service obligations of the former.27 While commercialisation of the media 
has been a major source of diversification and funding in many national media 
environments, evidence is growing to suggest that as competition intensifies, content 
is increasingly being shaped by the demands of advertisers and sponsors rather than 
public interest factors.28 Derek Forbes, in his book A watchdog’s guide to 
investigative reporting, gives examples of how commercial considerations can 
influence the volume of investigative reporting. He concludes that ‘of all the risks, 
those that threaten a media organisation’s financial viability need to be taken most 
seriously’. He reinforces this when he refers to the legal defence strategy adopted by 
the Mail & Guardian and concludes that ‘this tighter legal vetting system has helped 
the newspaper to control legal costs by preventing the escalation of any legal 
situation, and has contributed to the newspaper’s recent financial turnaround.’29  
 
 
 
 
27 Berger, G. 2001. De-racialisation, democracy and development: transformation of the 
South African media 1994-2000, in Media, democracy and renewal in southern Africa. 
Colorado Springs: International Academic Publishers: 151-180. 
28 Deane, J. op cit.: 15. 
29 Forbes, D. 2005. A watchdog’s guide to investigative reporting. Johannesburg: Konrad 
Adenauer Stiftung. 
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Witting or unwitting disregard for professional ethics 
 
The second threat is disregard, unwitting or not, for professional journalism. In the 
liberal tradition, at least, journalism is rationalised on the basis of the ideology of 
professionalism, and, as such, it must be seen to work to a code of conduct which 
guarantees the integrity of those working as journalists. To this end, the journalist’s 
profession can be described as that of ‘licensed relayer of facts’. Journalism is 
presented to its audience as a truthful discourse about the real world. Journalistic 
ethics can be seen as a device to facilitate the social construction of legitimacy, to 
mobilise the trust of the audience in what they are reading, hearing or seeing. In their 
proclamation and definition ethical standards also have a major impact on journalistic 
content, not least news.30  
 
Many have bemoaned the perceived lack of journalistic professionalism among 
African media. In Zambia, journalists are still struggling in their attempts to set up a 
media council to regulate themselves. In Tanzania, however, such efforts have borne 
fruit, with the entrenchment of the Tanzania Media Council. In Malawi, like in Zambia, 
the media still appear to be disorganised, largely because of a lack of resources to 
step up their campaign to mobilise sufficient media support for the strengthening of 
the Malawi Media Council. In Swaziland, there is a move towards effecting a Media 
Complaints Council. For some observers, any disregard for media ethics can be used 
as an excuse for state intervention. 31 
 
2. State-centric threats 
 
The state poses a great many threats to the media-citizens compact. In Africa, at 
least, the state can be held responsible for a myriad of constitutional, legal, and 
extra-legal manoeuvres that frustrate the media in their service of citizens.  
 
Constitutional limitations and disregard for the rule of law 
 
In almost all African countries, the constitutional guarantees of media freedom are 
subject to such ‘claw-back clauses’ as ‘national security’, ‘public health’, ‘public 
morality’, ‘personal privacy’, etc. In Zambia, there is a constitutional review process 
30 McNair, B. 2001. The sociology of journalism. London: Arnold: 65. 
31 For this, see Nyamnjoh, F. 2005. Africa’s media: democracy & the politics of belonging. 
London, New York & Pretoria: Zed Books & UNISA Press. 
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underway, but the ruling party is frustrating efforts at constitutionalising the editorial 
independence of the state broadcasting system. In several other countries -- 
Lesotho, Swaziland, Namibia, Malawi, etc. -- state broadcasting systems continue to 
remain largely in the service of ruling or monarchic elites. Although Malawi has set up 
the Malawi Communications Regulatory Authority (MACRA), effective control of state 
broadcasting lies with the President as he is vested with the power to appoint and 
disappoint the board. In Zambia, the enactment of an Independent Broadcasting 
Authority (IBA) Act to place broadcast regulation into independent hands has not 
taken off because the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services has refused 
to recognise the names of those appointed to sit on the inaugural board of directors.  
 
Archaic and retrogressive legal regimes 
 
In almost all southern African countries, there is an archaic legal regime, inherited 
from the colonial powers, which seems to limit media freedom further. In Botswana, 
the Public Service Act prohibits public servants from disclosing the contents of any 
document, communication or information in the course of their duties unless 
authorised. In Malawi, the Official Secrets Act remains in office, ‘gagging’ public 
servants and rendering journalism risky. In Zambia, there are several pieces of 
legislation that militate against media freedom; among these are the Official Secrets 
Act, the Public Order Act, and the Penal Code. In Zimbabwe, things are even worse, 
with the enactment in 2002 of the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy 
Act, which classifies certain categories of information held by government 
departments, statutory bodies and government agencies. It also requires that 
journalists register with the Media and Information Commission.32  
 
Access to public information laws 
 
In most of southern Africa, efforts to legislate a Freedom of Information Act have 
largely failed. This has perhaps being a result, in part, of the US Patriot Act, which 
many African governments are using to justify their reluctance to legislate in favour of 
access to public information. Even in South Africa, some old legislation inherited from 
the apartheid era remains in place, at least as of 2005. These laws restrict reporting 
on police and military activities, and may also be used to force reporters to reveal the 
identity of their sources. They include: (i) the Criminal Procedure Act  of 1977; (ii) the 
32 Forbes, D. 2005. A watchdog’s guide to investigative reporting. Johannesburg: Konrad 
Adenauer Stiftung: 92-115. 
 12 
                                                 
Defence Act of 1957; (iii) the Armaments Development and Petroleum Act of 1968; 
and (iv) Control of Access to Public Premises and Vehicles Act of 1985.33 
 
Other state manoeuvres 
 
Some African governments continue to employ a variety of political strategies to 
cripple private media, such as withdrawal of state advertising from such media, 
harassment of reporters through ruling party cadres and state police, tax on the 
means of media production (e.g. import duty on newsprint), etc. In Zambia, it was 
united civil society pressure that compelled the Minister of Finance to rescind his 
decision early in 2006 to introduce value added tax (VAT) on the cover price of 
newspapers. 
 
The above state-centric threats might explain why some countries are not willing to 
sign up to the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) enunciated by the African 
Union (AU), for fear of being subjected to scrutiny. By 2005, only 23 countries, out of 
the 54 African states, had signed up.34 But even where countries have signed up to 
the APRM, there is insufficient information placed in the public domain by the state to 
enable people monitor their adherence to democratic norms. Again, even here, we 
see the state information departments emphasising their countries’ involvement with 
the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) than with the APRM. This 
reinforces the perception that issues of communicative freedom are less important 
than economic or trade related issues. 
 
3. Civil threats 
 
Threats to the ideal of a media-citizens compact do not only originate from the media 
and the state, they also stem from the citizens themselves.  
 
 
 
 
 
33 Ibid.: 103-105 
34 By 2005, only 23 of the 54 countries had signed up to the APRM, according to AfricaFocus. 
2005. [0]. Available: http://www.africafocus.org/docs06/econ0601.php. Accessed on 
2/05/2006. 
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State capture of civil society 
 
There is evidence to suggest that organised civil society, especially NGOs, can be 
co-opted into the state apparatus and thus lose its mobilising credibility.35 There are 
examples of high-profile NGO leaders that have been co-opted into the state 
machinery and their testimony on behalf of civil society has become enmeshed with 
official rhetoric. As Patrick Chabal observes: 
 
The state aims at political and economic hegemony. Civil society is the subject 
of this hegemonic appropriation. The African state has sought since 
independence to capture as much of civil society as it can manage. Civil 
society, for its part, seeks to evade or undermine such capture and it is 
essentially this process of reaction to the state which defines it as civil society. 
In other words, civil society is transformed from the object of the state’s 
hegemonic drive into the self-conscious subject of its own politics in the process 
of responding…to the state project of domination. Its politics, therefore, are the 
politics of counter-hegemony.36 
 
Constantly evading such ‘state capture’ is what I think gives civil society the quality of 
‘revolution’, of unpredictability. Indeed, one key problem that I see with organised civil 
society in Africa -- what I could refer to as a ‘corporatised’ civil society -- is that it is 
robbing the concept of its ethnographic spontaneity and unpredictability which can be 
a revolutionising force. The ‘corporatisation’ of civil society means that civil society 
lays more stress on the organisational-strategic aspects of its existence than on its 
organic roots within the social structure. In part, this is a result of having to rely on 
outside financing for its justification and existence. Although some ‘organised’ civil 
society organisations are much more effective at mobilising people power, as 
demonstrated in the Jubilee 2000 campaigns for Third World debt cancellation, such 
organisations are too bureaucratically inclined to resonate with the needs of 
grassroots communities.   
 
 
35 Cited in, Moyo, D. 2006. Broadcasting policy reform and democratisation in Zambia and 
Zimbabwe, 1990-2005: Global pressures, national responses. PhD thesis, University of Oslo, 
Oslo.  
36 Quoted in, Cited in, Moyo, D. 2006. Broadcasting policy reform and democratisation in 
Zambia and Zimbabwe, 1990-2005: Global pressures, national responses. PhD thesis, 
University of Oslo, Oslo: 46-47.  
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Political apathy 
 
A more general problem, sometimes reinforced by the co-option of NGOs into the 
state apparatus, is civic apathy. This can be seen in the low political participation 
evident in between elections. This is amply demonstrated by the Afrobarometer 
surveys. While about 71 percent of Africans claimed to have voted in the last national 
election, only 43 percent report having joined with others to raise an issue. Only 11 
percent report having joined a protest,37 indicating that civic activism is on the 
decline.  
 
In some cases, the problems I have referred to are compounded by an over-
commercialised and elitist media system that squeezes out civil society voices, and 
by a recalcitrant state apparatus that leaves little room for civil society and mediated 
expression. 
 
There is a case to be made, therefore, for reinvigorating civil society so that it 
becomes more responsive to the needs and aspirations of its constituents, and 
relevant to the changing times.   
 
5.0. Conclusion 
 
I have noted that the World Press Freedom Day theme -- media, development and 
poverty eradication -- reflects a shift in conceptualising development more in terms of 
‘freedom’ than in terms of ‘econometrics’, i.e. measures of gross national product, 
personal incomes, etc. This emphasis on ‘development’ as ‘freedom’, championed by 
scholars like Amatya Sen, has led me to position ‘citizenship’ as ‘freedom’. I have 
thus defined ‘citizenship’ in terms of juridical, political, economic and cultural 
freedoms available to individuals or collectivities to enable them actively participate in 
the body politic. 
 
I have introduced ‘media’ into the fabric of citizenship and argued that the role of the 
media is to enhance the enjoyment of citizenship rights and freedoms. I have 
characterised this relationship between media and citizens as a ‘compact’ to stress 
the fact that there is something of a formal relationship between media and citizens, 
37 Afrobarometer. 2002. Afrobarometer briefing paper no.1 April 2002. Key findings about 
public opinion in Africa. [0]. Available: http://www.afrobarometer.org. 
 
 15 
                                                 
in which media are the servants of the people. This compact revolves around media, 
however instituted (public, commercial or community), answering to a higher calling, 
namely ‘public interest’ or ‘public service’. 
 
I have isolated three sources of threats to this compact, namely media-centric, state-
centric and civil threats, arguing that the three can reinforce each other to challenge 
the enjoyment of citizenship rights and freedoms. It is clear that the media have a 
role to play in enhancing citizenship. Freer citizens are a more effective testimony of 
a freer media system. However, this ‘media-citizenship compact’ can only be 
strengthened in the presence of ‘public interest’ media, an enabling legislative and 
policy environment, and active citizenship. 
___________________________________________________________________ 
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